Louisiana Law Review
Volume 77
Number 3 Louisiana Law Review - Spring 2017

Article 9

3-8-2017

Domestic Drone Surveillance: The Court’s Epistemic Challengeand
Wittgenstein’s Actional Certainty
Robert Greenleaf Brice
Katrina L. Sifferd

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Repository Citation
Robert Greenleaf Brice and Katrina L. Sifferd, Domestic Drone Surveillance: The Court’s Epistemic
Challengeand Wittgenstein’s Actional Certainty, 77 La. L. Rev. (2017)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol77/iss3/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Domestic Drone Surveillance: The Court’s Epistemic
Challenge and Wittgenstein’s Actional Certainty
Robert Greenleaf Brice and Katrina L. Sifferd
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................................. 805
I.

The Fourth Amendment: Searches and Privacy ........................... 808
A. Reasonable Searches and Probable Cause ............................. 808
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy ....................................... 812

II.

The Court’s Epistemic Challenge: Common Sense
Knowledge and Actional Certainty .............................................. 815
A. Common Sense Philosophy ................................................... 815
B. Wittgenstein’s On Certainty .................................................. 817
C. Objections .............................................................................. 821
D. Wittgenstein’s Actional Certainty and Expectations
of Privacy ............................................................................... 822

III. The Fourth Amendment: A Wittgensteinian Approach ............... 824
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Actional Certainty .. 824
B. The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment ..................... 827
Conclusion.................................................................................... 830
INTRODUCTION
According to the Washington Post, between 2010 and 2012,
unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”), commonly known as “drones,” were
deployed nearly 700 times by U.S. Customs and Border Protection on
behalf of local and state law enforcement agencies.1 In 2015, the Federal
Copyright 2017, by ROBERT GREENLEAF BRICE AND KATRINA L. SIFFERD.
 Robert Greenleaf Brice is a lecturer in the Sociology, Anthropology, and
Philosophy Department at Northern Kentucky University. He holds a PhD in
philosophy from Michigan State University.
 Katrina Sifferd is Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Elmhurst
College. She holds a J.D. and a PhD in philosophy from King’s College London.
1. Craig Whitlock & Craig Timber, Border Patrol Drones Being Borrowed
by Other Agencies More Often Than Previously Known, WASH. POST (Jan. 14,
2014), http://www.governing.com/news/headlines/Police-Agencies-Using-BorderPatrols-Drones-More-Often-Than-Thought.html [https://perma.cc/KNW8-HEAG].
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Aviation Administration (“FAA”) began accepting applications for drone
licenses by law enforcement agencies.2 Given the number of different ways
drones can now aid departments in gathering intelligence, the number of
applications will likely only increase. Drones can be equipped with facial
recognition software,3 heat sensors, and other high-tech features, such as
microphones capable of detecting gunshots and even personal
conversations.4 Some military grade drones are equipped with “Wi-Fi
crackers” and bogus cell phone towers that allow law enforcement to
pinpoint a suspect’s location while simultaneously intercepting text
messages and phone calls.5 Some of these drones can remain airborne for
hours, even days. Tiny drones, also known as “insect drones” or “microdrones,” are currently in development and are said to be capable of going
completely undetected.6
Although drones can be used for a wide range of positive and
beneficial objectives—for example, crop and land surveys, power line and
pipeline inspections, forest fire detection, and search-and-rescue
missions7—some agencies have used drones in ways that raise serious
privacy concerns. For example, in 2011, the Los Angeles Times reported
that police in Grand Forks, North Dakota had used a Predator B Drone—
2. Ben Wolfgang, FAA Chief Says Drones Will Force Change at Agency,
WASH. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/7
/faa-chief-says-drones-will-force-change-at-agency/ [https://perma.cc/WM3B-RP
BK].
3. Amanda Ziadeh, Drones Get Sightline Tracking, Facial Recognition Tech,
GCN (Nov. 7, 2016), https://gcn.com/articles/2016/11/07/drone-partnership.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q9F5-EEJP].
4. Tina Moore, NYPD Considering Using Drones and Gunshot Detectors to
Fight Crime, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 20, 2014, 11:45 PM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/new-york/nyc-crime/nypd-drones-fight-crime-article-1.1799980 [https:
//perma.cc/VQ62-AAXS].
5. Andy Greenberg, Flying Drone Can Crack Wi-Fi Networks, Snoop on Cell
Phones, FORBES (July 28, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011
/07/28/flying-drone-can-crack-wifi-networks-snoop-on-cell-phones/#55284a2f66f9
[https://perma.cc/8SGL-QLJ7].
6. Adam Piore, Rise of the Insect Drones, POPULAR SCI. (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/rise-insect-drones [https://perma.cc/T3CJVTZG]. Insect drones were recently depicted in the 2015 movie, Eye in the Sky. EYE
IN THE SKY (Entertainment One & Raindog Films 2015).
7. Some agencies have used drones for the very purpose of search and rescue.
Dee J. Hall, Fitchburg Man Found Alive, WIS. ST. J. (Jul. 19, 2014), http://host.madi
son.com/wsj/news/local/crime_and_courts/fitchburg-man-found-alive-unharmed-af
ter-nearly-three-days-outside/article_f6274133-90b6-5282-98d8-1304bb6d1f8d.html
[https://perma.cc/DU43-KGNE].
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equipped with “heat sensors and [a] sophisticated radar”—to help locate
three individuals suspected of cattle rustling.8 The drone was fitted with a
live-feed camera, enabling law enforcement officials to pinpoint the
suspects’ exact location.9 In 2009, the Texas Department of Public Safety
launched a bird-sized drone called a “Wasp” over a suspect’s house while
waiting to execute a search warrant.10 The drone offered law enforcement
officials an aerial view of the property before they raided the residence.
In light of increased drone use, there has been a bipartisan effort in
Louisiana to pass legislation regulating drones.11 These measures are
important, and lawmakers are correct in their attempts to clarify what
citizens can and cannot do with these machines. In 2016, Governor
Edwards signed into law two bills restricting drone use.12 The first restricts
drone use near schools, school property, or correctional facilities.13 It
includes exceptions for police and for situations in which the landowner
grants permission.14 The second subjects drone usage to criminal
trespassing laws.15 Notably, however, neither of these bills regulate the use
of drones by police.
Although the use of drones will undoubtedly provide law enforcement
agencies with new means of gathering intelligence, these unmanned
aircrafts bring with them a host of legal and epistemic complications. This
Article examines the domestic use of drones by law enforcement to gather
8. Brian Bennet, Police Employ Predator Drone Spy Planes on Home Front,
L.A. T IMES (Dec. 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/10/nation/la-nadrone-arrest-20111211 [https://perma.cc/CV4L-R5ET].
9. Id.
10. Peter Fin, Domestic Use of Aerial Drones by Law Enforcement Likely to
Prompt Privacy Debate, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2011, 12:56 AM), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/22/AR2011012204111.html?sid=S
T2011012204147 [https://perma.cc/AJ3G-N95K].
11. Louisiana Lawmakers Want to Get Drones Under Control, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(April 26, 2016, 9:46 AM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/04/louisiana
_lawmakers_want_to_ge.html [https://perma.cc/VP4G-CFAB].
12. Edwards Agrees to New Restrictions on Drones in Louisiana, WDSU
NEWS (June 22, 2016, 8:59 AM), http://www.wdsu.com/article/edwards-agreesto-new-restrictions-on-drones-in-louisiana/3608454 [https://perma.cc/3UVA-R7
U9].
13. H.B. 19, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016) (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §§
14:337(A), (D), (E), 14:377(B)(3)(d)) http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument
.aspx?d=1012765 [https://perma.cc/6J7R-BV88].
14. Id.
15. S.B. 141, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016) (passed and signed into law 2016),
http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1012711 [https://perma.cc/QD
Z4-EJWZ].
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information. First, Part I considers the Fourth Amendment and the
different legal standards of proof that might apply to law enforcement
drone use. Part II then explores philosopher Wittgenstein’s notion of
actional certainty. Part III discusses how the theory of actional certainty
can apply to the Supreme Court and its epistemic challenge of determining
what is a “reasonable” expectation of privacy. This Part also investigates
the Mosaic Theory as a possible reading of the Fourth Amendment.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCHES AND PRIVACY
“The purpose of the probable-cause requirement of the Fourth
Amendment [is] to keep the state out of constitutionally protected areas
until it has reason to believe that a specific crime has been or is being
committed.”16 A search passes constitutional muster, then, if law
enforcement has probable cause to think a crime has or is occurring17 or if
the search does not constitute an unreasonable intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area18 or does not violate a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.19 In light of this constitutional framework, this
Section first discusses the standard of probable cause as applied to law
enforcement use of drone surveillance and then whether drone surveillance
violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
A. Reasonable Searches and Probable Cause
The Fourth Amendment has two clauses. First, citizens are protected
against unreasonable searches.20 Second, warrants may be issued only
when they describe with particularity the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.21 In U.S. v. Leon, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted that “[a] Fourth Amendment case may present two separate
questions: whether the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant issued
in accordance with the second Clause, and, if not, whether it was
nevertheless ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the first.”22 If a
governmental search is found to have violated the Fourth Amendment, the
fruits of the search are not admissible as evidence in court because such
16. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
17. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 & n.23 (1968).
18. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
19. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Id.
22. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 961 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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evidence is considered “fruit of the poisonous tree.”23 Thus, the Fourth
Amendment—at least in theory—should act as a significant limit on police
power.24 All of the rights contained in the Fourth Amendment have been
selectively incorporated so as to apply to the states.25
Many searches performed by law enforcement are done without a
warrant and without violating Fourth Amendment protections. By only
prohibiting “unreasonable” searches and seizures, the language of the
Fourth Amendment indicates that “reasonable” searches and seizures by
law enforcement are constitutional.26 A search is deemed reasonable when
the police can prove first, that it is more likely than not that a crime has
occurred,27 and second, if a search is conducted, it is probable the police
will find either stolen goods or evidence of the crime.28 These two
requirements constitute probable cause to perform a search. Probable
cause can be established to obtain a warrant before a search or can be used
to justify the reasonableness of a search after the fact.29
Judicial decision-making regarding the finding of probable cause,
whether before or after a search is conducted, is a notoriously tricky
question:
The nature of probable cause poses a serious cognitive challenge
for judges in implementing their role as the guardians of the
Fourth Amendment. The cornerstone of reasonableness in
searches is the concept of “probable cause.” Commonly, a judge
23. Nardonne v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
24. However, some legal scholars worry that in the past three decades the
Supreme Court has significantly whittled away the Fourth Amendment’s
protective power by declaring police activities “that could only be described as
‘searches’ in common parlance as not constituting ‘searches’ at all under the
Fourth Amendment.” Craig M. Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth
Amendment, 84 IND. L.J. 1099, 1100 (2009).
25. John Burkoff, Law Enforcement Use of Drones & Privacy Rights in the
United States 2 (Univ. of Pittsburg Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2014-34, 2014).
26. See, e.g., Craig Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX.
L.R. 951, 952–56 (2003) (“The reality experienced by American citizens today is
that they are searched and seized on a regular basis, and for the vast majority of
these searches (e.g., airport searches, street stops, DUI checkpoints, urine testing
of government employees), the constitutionality seems to turn not on probable
cause, but on the reasonableness of the search, factoring in the degree of the
intrusion and the gravity of the investigated offense.”).
27. Probable cause means that a reasonable and cautious officer would believe
that criminal activity is or was taking place. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
28. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
29. Id.
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will assess probable cause before the search has been conducted
because the police normally have to obtain a warrant before
conducting a search. But with numerous exceptions to the warrant
requirement that arise from the inevitable exigencies of law
enforcement, the police conduct a search without obtaining a
warrant. When faced with such an exigency, the police may avoid
the need for a warrant, but they must still have probable cause for
the search. The purpose behind allowing an exigency to exempt the
police from the warrant requirement is a practical one, but is not
supposed to allow the police to be subject to a more lenient standard
of review. When searches conducted without a warrant produce
incriminating evidence to be used against a criminal defendant, the
judge must assess probable cause in full knowledge that the search
uncovered incriminating evidence. Judges must assess the facts just
as if they did not know that the search uncovered incriminating
evidence. The standard remains the same, but the perspective from
which judges review a case inevitably differs in hindsight.30
There are many circumstances wherein courts are asked to determine
whether a warrantless search, seizure, or arrest is reasonable after the fact.
Cases where a search is presumed reasonable include circumstances in
which a felony arrest is being made in a public place;31 circumstances in
which the search is incident to a lawful arrest;32 and circumstances in
which an officer reasonably believes that criminal activity may be afoot in
a public place.33 The courts have also held that other “exigent”
circumstances are likely to justify a warrantless search, such as shots fired,
screams heard, or fire emanating from inside a building.34
As probable cause itself incorporates an assessment of the likely
outcome of the search, it seems vulnerable to the influence of the hindsight
bias, which is the tendency persons have of increased confidence in the
odds of an outcome once the actual outcome is known.35 This bias
notoriously influences probability judgments36 and may indicate that
30. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight,
8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72, 73 (2011).
31. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976).
32. Chimel v. Californa, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
34. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011).
35. Ulrich Hoffrage, Ralph Hertwig, & Gerd Gigerenzer, Hindsight Bias: A ByProduct of Knowledge Updating?, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH., 556, 566–81 (2000).
The hindsight bias is also known as the “I knew it all along” effect. Id. at 566.
36. Id.
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judges would be more likely to find a search was justified in cases where
actual criminal evidence was found than in cases where no evidence was
found. Despite one study that found at least some judges are able to avoid
this bias,37 some searches by law enforcement might appear justified by
probable cause after the fact in part due to the successful outcome of the
search.
Worries regarding after-the-fact justifications of a search highlight the
epistemic challenge facing law enforcement and courts in assessing the
probabilities regarding probable cause. Determining whether it is more
likely than not that a crime has occurred, and whether the proposed search
will generate further evidence of this crime, is a difficult task prior to a
search. This task is made even more difficult by the realities of in-the-field
policing, which results in many probable cause judgments made in
hindsight with knowledge of the outcome of the search.
The challenge is even more pronounced when the evidence provided
in support of probable cause is supplied by drone surveillance. A drone
can be circling for hours, even days, gathering intelligence on a target
without probable cause. Information gathered via drone may then be used
to obtain a warrant to search once evidence of a crime has been gathered.
Then, once a warrant is obtained, the police may enter the specified area
of the property and search for items listed on the warrant. Police may then
extend the search beyond the specified area of the property or include other
items in the search beyond those specified in the warrant if it is necessary
to ensure their safety or the safety of others, to prevent the destruction of
evidence, to discover more about possible evidence or stolen items that are
in plain view, or to hunt for evidence or stolen items that, based upon their
initial search of the specified area, they believe may be in a different
location on the property.38 In this way, drone use by law enforcement may
increase probable cause judgments made in hindsight after incriminating
evidence has already been found, and thereby increase search powers for
law enforcement.

37. Rachlinski, supra note 30. The hindsight bias by judges is a real concern.
If the judge already knows a particular raid produced incriminating evidence,
whether a case can be reasonable and fairly assessed is highly questionable.
Inquiry into what can be known cannot presuppose that it already is known.
Knowledge can be established only after a certain set of criteria has been met.
Even then, some epistemologists are still skeptical. See Edmund Gettier, Is
Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963).
38. See generally Phyllis Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement:
Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VANDERBILT L.J. 473 (1991).

812

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Traditionally, constitutional search and seizure jurisprudence has
relied upon the trespass doctrine, which states that when law enforcement
effects an unreasonable physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area, a violation of the Fourth Amendment has occurred.39 The trespass
doctrine’s requirement of a physical intrusion means that trespass law is
less relevant to drone surveillance because no physical intrusion usually
occurs when law enforcement uses a drone to provide surveillance
thousands of feet in the air in legally navigable airspace.40
The FAA dictates where drones may safely fly, but much surveillance
can occur from legal airspace. A police officer viewing objects on private
property that can be seen from a public vantage point is not subject to
Fourth Amendment protection if it is in “plain view”41—even with
binoculars.42 The reason this protection is afforded to police is that law
enforcement’s observation of items in plain view is not deemed a search
under the Constitution.43 Cases involving law enforcement aircraft use
have generally held that using airspace to see things in “plain sight” is
acceptable.44 For example, in Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., the Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to photographs taken
from altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet.45 As one legal scholar has
noted, “[a]pplied mechanically, [the public view] doctrine would have
devastating implications for surveillance by drones, or any other form of
advanced surveillance technology, operating in public spaces. However . .
. the Court has acknowledged that, as technology advances, it may need to
modify its Fourth Amendment analysis.”46
One way to avoid this sort of mechanical analysis would be to focus
on the 1967 Supreme Court case of Katz v. U.S., which held that although
“the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional
‘right to privacy,’”47 the Amendment “protects people, not places.”48 Thus,
what a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
39. Brooke Hofhenke, The Fourth Amendment in the Coming Drone Age, 15
DARTMOUTH L.J. (manuscript at 13) (forthcoming 2017).
40. Id. at 15.
41. Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
42. United States v. Lee, 35 F.Supp. 2d 657 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
43. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
44. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
45. Dow Chemical Co. v. U S., 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
46. Hofhenke, supra note 39, at 38.
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
48. Id. at 351.
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the public, may be constitutionally protected.”49 In Katz, Justice Harlan in
a concurring opinion established a twofold requirement for claims that law
enforcement has violated the Fourth Amendment by violating a reasonable
expectation of privacy.50 First, a person must have “exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy,” and second, the expectations must be
ones “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”51
Thus, an unconstitutional search occurs when a subjective expectation
of privacy determined to be reasonable under the circumstances has been
violated by state action with no probable cause. Many searches performed
are warrantless, and in some cases police may search and seize items or
evidence when there is no physical trespass and no legitimate expectation
of privacy, and thus no search. Establishing a reasonable subjective
expectation of privacy would seem to involve exploration of what a person
knowingly exposes to the public because details of a person’s life that may
be publicly known are “not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”52
Complex epistemic issues for a court determining whether a search
was “reasonable” present themselves. For example, when law enforcement
does not feel the subject of a search has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, police will not attempt to secure a warrant. Thus, any challenges
to a search will be raised after the search has already been performed, often
as a result of the defense’s attempt to exclude the fruits of the search. For
courts, establishing a subject’s expectation of privacy after the search has
occurred, however, is difficult. First, it is often difficult to determine what
a person “knowingly exposes” to the public. For example, an individual
may do her pharmacy shopping in public but still have a subjective
expectation that her birth control habits will remain private. Second,
establishing expectations of privacy after a search may be subject to the
hindsight bias. To expand upon the drug store example, once a court
discovers the individual was buying over-the-counter drugs in order to
make and sell illegal drugs, it may be less likely that the court will
determine that the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy
regarding her shopping habits at the drug store.
These difficult issues might be worse in cases where drone
surveillance is used by law enforcement. As an illustration, suppose a
drone is deployed to continuously monitor a particular street corner for
illegal activity. A man is spotted entering an empty storefront every Friday
at 8:00 p.m. A woman is also seen entering through the back door around

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 361.
Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
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the same time. Law enforcement determines the man’s pattern of activity
is sufficient to provide probable cause that a crime is occurring. Police use
this evidence, gleaned without performing a “search”—because the police
claim there was no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the
man’s actions—to secure a warrant to perform a physical search of the
property on a Friday at 8:30 p.m. They discover the man with a prostitute
inside the property and arrest him.
If the man claims he had a reasonable, subjective expectation of
privacy with regard to his pattern of movements, even though they were
public, how a court would evaluate this claim is questionable. No doubt
the man truly hoped and even expected his meeting the prostitute in an
empty storefront would remain private, given the precautions he had taken
to meet the prostitute away from his home or workplace. The question is
whether this expectation was reasonable. Assuming it is ever reasonable
for someone to expect criminal activity to remain private, it would seem
reasonable in this case.
This example raises several questions. The first is how the court will
establish a subject’s expectation of privacy when the subject’s behavior is
already being recorded by law enforcement, particularly after the search is
already complete and criminal activity has been exposed. This concern
touches upon worries regarding hindsight bias. The second is the way in
which the new technology of drone surveillance allows law enforcement
access to public action in a new way. The use of drones for surveillance
seems to make worse the court’s challenge of demonstrating an
expectation of privacy because drones allow for continuous or collective
monitoring of public action.53 In light of this technology, the court must
determine whether any behavior citizens knowingly expose to the
public—behavior such that citizens were traditionally deemed to have no
reasonable expectation of privacy54—can be interpreted as private
nonetheless because the behavior is performed by citizens under the
assumption that their lives are not subject to long-term monitoring and
analysis by the state.

53. For example, ordinarily, people have no reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to their license plate number. However, “the analysis changes
if the ALPR [automatic license plate reader] is attached to a drone where such
technology could, unlike a stationary ALPR, lock on a target’s every move for
weeks at a time and monitor that individual’s movements with pinpoint accuracy.”
Sean Sullivan, Domestic Drone Use and the Mosaic Theory 24–25 (Univ. of N.M.
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2013-02, 2013),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2212398 [https://perma.cc/6U5B-M2AE].
54. Id.
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II. THE COURT’S EPISTEMIC CHALLENGE: COMMON SENSE KNOWLEDGE
AND ACTIONAL CERTAINTY
While drone surveillance creates difficult legal hurdles for the Court,
less obvious are the complicated epistemic challenges underpinning the
legal difficulties. At issue is whether the Court will cast behavior citizens
knowingly expose to the public as private. What citizens knowingly expose
to the public and how citizens’ actions are linked to this knowledge are
two issues that Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein discusses in his
posthumously published notes entitled, On Certainty.55 To seek clarity
from Wittgenstein’s discussion, however, we must first turn to the
epistemic movement it presupposes, “Common Sense Philosophy.”
A. Common Sense Philosophy
“Common sense philosophy” maintains that an ordinary, or “common
sense,” view of the world is, by and large, correct.56 Its epistemic focus
highlights the fact that human beings not only know that common sense
convictions about the world are true, but that human beings know these
convictions with certainty.57 As such, common sense philosophy is often
used as a justificatory tool to combat skepticism. One of its leading
proponents was the British philosopher G.E. Moore.58 In his 1925 article,
“A Defense of Common Sense,” Moore catalogued a “long list of
propositions . . . every one of which,” he said, “I know, with certainty, to
55. See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (G.E.M.
Anscombe & G.H. von Wright eds., D. Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1972)
[hereinafter ON CERTAINTY].
56. George Edward Moore, A Defense of Common Sense, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 33 (1962).
57. Ryan Nichols, Thomas Reid, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reid/#ComSen FirPri [https://perma.cc/8PTN72P8] (last updated Sept. 23, 2014).
58. Moore, however, was not the first to advocate common sense in an effort
to combat skepticism. This thread can be traced back to the 18th century and
Thomas Reid’s “Scottish School of Common Sense.” Against Cartesian
skepticism, Reid had claimed.
[t]he evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, and the evidence of the
necessary relations of things, are all distinct and original kinds of
evidence, equally grounded on our constitution . . . . To reason against
any of these kinds of evidence is absurd . . . . They are first principles;
and such fall not within the province of reason, but of common sense.
SELECTIONS FROM THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE 48 (G.A.
Johnston, ed. 1915) (2012).
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be true.”59 The propositions contained in this list were such “obvious
truisms” that we hardly find occasion to utter them. They included such
trivially evident statements as,
There exists at present a living human body, which is my body . . .
there are a large number of other living human bodies, each of
which has . . . at some time been born . . . continued to exist for
some time after birth . . . been, at every moment of its life after birth,
either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth; and
many of these bodies have already died and ceased to exist.60
Moore often used “certainty” to place emphasis on what he already
“knew,” supposing that it might provide even stronger justification against
the skeptic. For instance, at the end of his article entitled “Proof of an
External World,” he says his premises—“Here’s one hand, and here’s
another”—are “among things which I certainly did know.”61 In another
article entitled “Certainty,” Moore claims to “know with certainty that [he
has] clothes on.”62 Therefore, certainty seems to indicate a degree of
knowledge—specifically, knowledge in the highest degree.
Moore is far from the only philosopher to characterize certainty in this
manner. René Descartes and David Hume both used it to underscore what
they knew. Descartes, for instance, said, “I will . . . put aside everything
that admits of the least of doubt, as if I had discovered it to be completely
false. I will stay on this course until I know something certain, or, if
nothing else, until I at least know for certain that nothing is certain.”63
Likewise, Hume, while discussing necessity and human behavior, stated,
“I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the
fire and hold it there til [sic] it be consumed.”64 For these philosophers and
throughout the Western philosophical canon, certainty indicates
knowledge in the highest degree. Despite these assurances of certainty,
however, the assurances fail to address the problem of skepticism that the
original knowledge claim creates. If certainty is simply a level within the
larger body of knowledge, the level of certainty, whether low, moderate,
59. Moore, supra note 56, at 32.
60. Id. at 33.
61. George Edward Moore, Proof of an External World, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 127, 149–50 (1962).
62. George Edward Moore, Certainty, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 227, 227 (1962).
63. RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 17 (Donald A.
Cress, trans., 3rd ed. 1993) (1641).
64. David Hume, Of Liberty and Necessity, in AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 50, 58 (Dover Pubs., Inc. 2012) (1748) (emphasis
added).
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or even high, matters little. If all knowledge claims were susceptible to
doubt regardless, an emphasis on the degree of knowledge would not sway
skeptics. “I know with certainty that p” requires as much justification as
“I know that p” requires. The degree of certainty provided appears to be
of little consequence.
B. Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
For a set of first-draft notes, On Certainty contains many new and
important ideas. Wittgenstein sets out to examine topics that were brought
to his attention after reading Moore, who, in turn, was responding to topics
that Descartes’s epistemological project had elicited. Wittgenstein clearly
believed using common sense philosophy to combat skepticism regarding
true knowledge of the external world was correct.65 He considered
common sense truisms like Moore’s “The earth exists” or “I have never
been far from the surface of the earth”66 to be the most propositionally
basic. He referred to these sorts of statements as “hinge propositions”
because so much appeared to turn on them. 67 When expressed explicitly,
these propositions represent the most fundamental convictions. Hinge
propositions are not founded in evidence because nothing more fundamental
exists on the basis of which they could be believed. This important class of
propositions has to “stand fast,” like hinges fixed on a frame, so that the
door—that is, other language games—can turn.68 In four successive
passages in On Certainty, Wittgenstein describes these propositions:

65. Students enrolled in his 1939 seminar, the Philosophy of Mathematics,
report that he even adopted the following slogan: “Don’t treat your commonsense
like an umbrella. When you come into a room to philosophize, don’t leave it
outside but bring it in with you.” WITTGENSTEIN’S LECTURES ON THE
FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 68 (Cora Diamond ed. 1976). Numerous
passages throughout his middle and later periods establish his support for common
sense. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS, 61 (Rush Rhees
ed., Raymond Hargraves & Roger White trans., 1975) (1964); LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR 19–20 (Rush Rhees ed., Anthony
Kenny trans. 1974); see also id. at 257, (“Generality”); id. at 265 (“The
Inadequacy of the Frege-Russell Notation for Generality”); id. at 451 (“Infinity in
Mathematics”); id. at 460 (“On Set Theory”).
66. Moore, supra note 56, at 32.
67. See, e.g., ON CERTAINTY, supra note 55, §§ 341, 343, 355.
68. The term “language-game,” says Wittgenstein, “is meant to bring into
prominence the fact that . . . speaking [a] language is part of an activity, or of [a
culture,] a form of life.” LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
§23 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1972) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS].
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§ 341 [T]he questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the
fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were
like hinges on which those turn.
§ 342 That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific
investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.
§ 343 But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t
investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest
content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges
must stay put.
§ 344 My life consists in my being content to accept many things.69
Although Wittgenstein believed the common sense approach was
correct, he also recognized its limitations. Although common sense truisms
are often accepted without much thought, Wittgenstein urges readers to
consider how strange they sound when uttered, especially when situated
within a propositional knowledge claim, such as “I know that p.”70 Not only
do the truisms sound odd, they fail to defeat skepticism, which was
supposedly the very reason for their existence.71
Throughout On Certainty, Wittgenstein realizes that although
statements he had been calling “hinge propositions” contribute to society’s
“world view,” just as Moore’s common sense propositions do, they do not
function as propositions, strictly speaking. At sections 204 and 205,
Wittgenstein takes an important step in his theory, connecting what he had
been calling “hinge propositions” with action:
§ 204 Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to
an end—but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us
immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is
our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.
§ 205 If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true,
nor yet false.72
Thus, although the propositional character of the hinge drops out,
another non-propositional facet remains. Hinges that stand fast serve to
frame the background of thoughts and statements.73 These certainties are

69. ON CERTAINTY, supra note 55, §§ 341–344.
70. See id. § 4.
71. See generally Peter Klein, Skepticism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/ [https://perma.cc/
MYZ3-59WP] (last updated June 2, 2015).
72. ON CERTAINTY, supra note 55, §§ 204–205.
73. See, e.g., id. § 343 (“If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.”).
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grounded in human beings’ actions, not in their statements. As he stated
elsewhere,
Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet when I want to
get up from a chair? There is no why. I simply don’t. This is how
I act. . . . Sure evidence is what we accept as sure, it is evidence
that we go by in acting surely, acting without any doubt.74
In Wittgenstein’s developing, exploratory thought, he gradually,
though perhaps not consciously, moved away from the deceptive
expression “hinge proposition.”75 Beliefs, or hinges, that stood fast were
no longer to be thought of as propositional.76 This change marks a
profound shift in the epistemic landscape: a categorical divide between
knowledge and certainty and, in particular, a move away from
propositional certainty toward the non-propositional and non-ratiocinated,
a certainty manifested in action.77 Wittgensteinian certainties then, are
manifest without further explanation. They are “actional,” based on
reflexive actions rather than reflexive speech.
In sum, in On Certainty, what begins as an analysis of knowledge
inevitably leads Wittgenstein to consider what, if any, distinction exists
between “knowledge” and “certainty.” Whether one “knows that p” or one
“knows with certainty that p,” Wittgenstein recognizes both are
knowledge claims and, as such, are open to skeptical inquiry.78 The issue
here turns on the skeptic’s demand for grounds—for example, asking on
what grounds does the person make such a claim. On this issue, however,
Wittgenstein notes that grounds for certainty are not the same as grounds
for knowing because the two concepts are themselves different.79 As he
says, “[t]he difference between the concept of ‘knowing’ and the concept
of ‘being certain’ isn’t of any great importance at all, except where ‘I
know’ is meant to mean ‘I can’t be wrong.’”80 Thus, “knowing” and
“being certain” must be considered distinct concepts because they differ

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. § 196.
ON CERTAINTY, supra note 55, § 141.
Id. § 141.
Id. § 204.
This recognition occurs in several places in On Certainty. See, e.g., ON
CERTAINTY, supra note 55, §§ 1, 6–8, 11, 12, 14, 18, 42, 56, 58, 84, 86, 112–122,
160, 174, 178, 181–189, 194, 340, 357, 395, 481, 482.
79. Id. § 8.
80. Id. For circumstances when it is “of no great importance at all,” then, as
Wittgenstein says, “[i]n a law-court, for example, ‘I am certain” could replace ‘I
know’ in every piece of testimony.” Id.
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not in degree, as it had typically been described, but rather in kind. For
Wittgenstein, knowledge and certainty “belong to different categories.”81
By placing knowledge and certainty in different categories,
Wittgenstein began laying the groundwork for a new approach to skeptical
problems. Although knowledge claims require justificatory responses
when challenged—responses that are propositional in character—certainty
claims do not. Certainty, he argues, is altogether different from
knowledge.82 Hinge or common sense propositions may represent the most
certain, most fundamental convictions, but society believes them, and not
because it can justify them—these core-beliefs “lie beyond being justified
or unjustified.”83 Unlike Moore and other philosophers before him,
Wittgenstein does not stop here. A fundamental belief—for example, “The
earth exists”—is not justified when a person states it, reiterates it, or even
supplies further explanation for it. Rather, certainty that the earth exists is
exhibited, unreflectively, “in the way [we] act.”84 Civilization walks upon
the earth, wages war on it, plants trees on it, and buries its dead in it. The
convictions that stand fast for civilization frame the background of its
thoughts and statements. These certainties are grounded in unreflective
actions, not in unreflective utterances. Thus, Wittgenstein, instead of
saying, “This is why . . .” or “because . . .” at this point states, “I am
inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’”85 Of significance is that this
action—“what I do”—does not occur at any ratiocinative level. Although
it may be a thought that is considered and stated in hindsight, certainty is
not actively considered.
This proposition marks a profound shift in thought. Knowledge about
the world requires evidence and justification, but evidence for one’s
fundamental non-reflective convictions—evidence for certainty—is as
deep as one can possibly dig. “If I have exhausted the justifications I have
reached bedrock and my spade is turned.”86 Bedrock is an apt metaphor,
as some scholars have described his method in On Certainty as a “new
kind of foundationalism.”87 “New” because unlike the traditional
81. Id. § 308.
82. Id.
83. Id. § 359.
84. Id. § 395 (emphasis added).
85. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 68, § 217 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. See AVRUM STROLL ET AL., MOORE AND WITTGENSTEIN ON CERTAINTY
6 (1994); Daniéle Moyal-Sharrock, Logic in Action: Wittgenstein’s Logical
Pragmatism and the Impotence of Skepticism, 26 PHIL. INVESTIGATIONS 125,
127–28 (2003); ROBERT BRICE, EXPLORING CERTAINTY: WITTGENSTEIN AND
WIDE FIELDS OF THOUGHT, at xi (2014).
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propositional foundationalism found in Descartes, Moore, and others,
Wittgenstein’s foundationalism differs in kind. It is a non-propositional
certainty, grounded in unreflective actions.
C. Objections
Not all scholars agree with this assessment of Wittgenstein. Some,
such as A.C. Grayling and Martin Kush, believe among the other items
uncovered in On Certainty, a form of relativism is present.88 Grayling, in
particular, describes it as “classically strong relativism.” 89 Two problems
exist, however, with Grayling’s evaluation of On Certainty: first, he does
not accurately define relativism; and second, nowhere in his article does
he discuss Wittgenstein’s move from propositional certainty to nonpropositional, non-ratiocinated action.
Grayling defines relativism in a highly subjective way:
[T]ruth and knowledge are not absolute or invariable, but
dependent upon viewpoint, circumstances or historical conditions.
What is true for me might not be true for you; what counts as
knowledge from one viewpoint might not from another; what is
true at one time is false at another.90
This account of relativism is problematic. Although knowledge may not
be “absolute,” that does not mean it is merely subjective or “dependent

88. See Martin Kusch, Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Relativism, in
ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES 29
(Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofer-Kreidl, eds., 2016), http://www.academia
.edu/11693512/Wittgensteins_On_Certainty_and_Relativism [https://perma.cc
/5ANM-2ZQ5]. Kusch says it is “a mistake to count the book as a whole as either
relativistic or anti-relativistic.” Id. at 37. He sees some passages that advocate for
relativism and others that do not. Id. These statements are true for Grayling as
well.
89. Grayling actually believes two conflicting themes are present in On
Certainty: first, a reply to skepticism “of a broadly foundationalist stamp” and
second, “classically strong relativism.” A.C. GRAYLING, Wittgenstein on Skepticism
and Certainty, in WITTGENSTEIN: A CRITICAL READER 305, 305, 308 (H.J. Glock
ed., 2001). Although Grayling asserts these two themes are in conflict, the relativism
he finds in On Certainty poses a threat to Wittgenstein’s reply to foundationalism.
Grayling finds this tension so great that he divides his exegesis of On Certainty in
two. Id. at 306–07. He refers to the first theme, the reply to skepticism bearing the
stamp of foundationalism, as OC1, and the second theme, relativism, as OC2. Id.
90. Id. at 308.
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upon viewpoint.”91 Knowledge can be both objective and relative.92
Consider, for instance, a drug that has proven through well-designed,
randomized clinical trials to be a highly successful treatment for a
particular disease. This knowledge is a matter of objective knowledge.
Still, it is relative to existing knowledge and research because in 15 to 20
years, well-designed, randomized clinical trials may show that some
newer treatment is still more effective than the drug currently available.
Grayling’s definition of relativism stems from a commonly mistaken
understanding of antonyms. The antonym of “relative” is “absolute,” not
“objective.”93 John Rawls, the American moral and political philosopher,
once defined this sort of objective knowledge in terms of “provisional . . .
fixed points,” potentially subject to revision.94 Knowledge’s fallibility, and
in some sense relativity, does not mean that knowledge cannot be
objective, nor does it mean that society cannot be objectively certain of
many different things.95 The new kind of foundationalism present here
occurs when Wittgenstein ties what he calls “hinge propositions” with
acting. Grayling overlooks this shift. When formulated explicitly in
ordinary language, hinge propositions constitute the most fundamental
convictions. Evidence does not support them, according to Wittgenstein—
nothing more fundamental exists on the basis of which they could be
believed.96 Like hinges fixed on a frame, this special class of propositions
must “stand fast” for the door to turn.
D. Wittgenstein’s Actional Certainty and Expectations of Privacy
The epistemic distinction between knowledge and certainty is relevant
to the question regarding expectations of privacy over behavior a person
knowingly exposes to the public. In keeping with the above interpretation
of Wittgenstein, people possess a non-ratiocinated, actional certainty that
they are living their lives in private. Citizens know that their daily public
movements are exposed to public view in small ways, but they still act
with the certainty that their patterns of movement—which Justice
Sotomayor and others have noticed express identity and character97—will
91. Id.
92. NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST 65–68 (1955).
93. Letter from Dr. Martin Benjamin, Professor Emeritus, Dep’t of Philosophy,
Mich. State Univ., to Robert Brice (on file with author).
94. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19 (1971).
95. See GOODMAN, supra note 92.
96. ON CERTAINTY, supra note 55, § 341.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (“Awareness that the Government may be watching chills
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be private, that is, not scrutinized or evaluated by the government. As such,
a particular public task or snapshot of a behavior or action may be exposed
to the public and thus be in “plain view.”98 Taken together, however, a
compilation of these snapshots reveals a large part of citizens’ lives and
identities. Admittedly, these lives are lived within the public community.
Even so, citizens assume that their life plans, dreams, affiliations, goals,
characters, and identities are private unless they engage in a course of
specific, mindful action to place them on display.
For instance, citizens assume local police officials do not know their
sexual orientation or religious and political affiliations, unless they have
yard signs or bumper stickers or take other mindful action to expose
themselves, such as attending law enforcement meetings and discussing
one’s affiliations. Citizens would be surprised if local law enforcement
knew details of their lives. They are certain that these aspects of their lives
are private, and they are certain that they will remain private unless or until
they make them public with some positive, mindful action. Their certainty
is presupposed in their unreflective action of living their lives within their
communities. Hence, non-reflective actions exhibit a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding character and identities, even if particular
actions, within a particular short timeframe, are not private.
The certainty that details of citizens’ lives and identities will remain
private seems reasonable given the assumed epistemic limitations of those
who live nearby. Citizens would not expect other citizens or governmental
actors to learn details of their character and identity without their
knowledge based upon everyday public interactions or observations of
particular behavior. Only those with whom citizens have repeated close
contact are likely to learn about their private lives, and by having repeated
contact, citizens mindfully choose to expose certain aspects of themselves.
For example, a co-worker will know another’s professional skills; a dry
cleaner will know clothing preferences; and a grocer may learn eating
preferences. Citizens choose to interact regularly with these people,
knowing that they are exposing certain aspects of their lives to them.
Citizens would not expect their dry cleaners, however, to know their eating
preferences. Citizens would also not expect governmental actors, whom
they have not chosen to interact with, to know their character and identity.
associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s unrestrained
power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to
abuse.”); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–200 (2009) (“What the
technology yields and records with breathtaking quality and quantity is a highly
detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our
associations—political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few—
and of the pattern of our professional and avocational pursuits.”).
98. Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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To see how closely tied actional certainty is to a person’s expectation
of privacy, assume for a moment that a person’s life plans, goals, and other
personal aspects are not private. This public nature would have an effect
on a person’s actions. If citizens no longer had an expectation of privacy
with regard to affiliations, preferences, and identity when acting in
public—that is, if citizens thought their actions might be monitored,
surveilled, recorded, and analyzed—citizens would not likely perform
their daily actions in the same manner they would perform them had they
possessed this expectation. Perhaps citizens would with a few of their
actions, but certainly not all of them. Actions would very likely be altered,
in some cases even dramatically.99 Persons act with an unreflective
certainty that they are living their lives in private. This expectation is not
only a reasonable one to infer, but a necessary one—and it is necessarily
tied to unreflective actions.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH
Following the argument discussed in Part II.D, citizens possess a nonratiocinated, actional certainty that they are living the whole of lives in
private, free from government observance. While a particular public action
may be exposed to the public, and thus may be considered in “plain view,”
a compilation of these snapshots reveals a large part of citizens’ lives and
identities about which citizens have expectations of privacy. This actional
certainty helps inform the analysis regarding citizens’ privacy and the use
of drones.
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Actional Certainty
In general, law enforcement has a duty to obtain a warrant before
installing a surveillance device on a private citizen’s property.100 In U.S.
v. Jones, five of the Justices held that by attaching a GPS to the defendant’s
vehicle, the government physically intruded upon private property.101 The
Court dismissed the government’s argument that Jones had no reasonable
99. This example is not simply a hypothetical; a body of evidence supports this
proposition. See Arthur Beaman et al., Self-Awareness and Transgression in
Children: Two Field Studies, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1835, 1835–46
(1979). See generally Daniel Nettle et al., ‘Cycle Thieves, We Are Watching You’:
Impact of a Simple Signage Intervention against Bicycle Theft, PLOS ONE, Dec.
2012, at 1, DOI:10.1371/pone.0051738, http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article
?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0051738 [https://perma.cc/9QBL-2Q9C].
100. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
101. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
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expectation of privacy on a public street and stated that it must protect
privacy at least to the degree in which it existed at the time of the adoption
of the Fourth Amendment.102 Justice Sotomayor joined the majority, but
also wrote separately to express that under a Katz analysis, long-term
electronic surveillance would violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.103
Sotomayor argued that the majority opinion, which focused on the
government’s placing of the GPS system on the defendant’s car as a physical
trespass, provided little guidance in cases in which the government can
monitor movements without a physical invasion.104 Justice Sotomayor
argued that short-term remote surveillance may also qualify as a
constitutional violation in some circumstances.105 New technologies are
capable of painting a detailed picture of one’s personal life and are not
subjected to the same limitations as traditional forms of surveillance.106
Additionally, these newer technologies are cheap to purchase and
implement.107 Sotomayor quoted the New York appellate court opinion in
People v. Weaver108 at length:
Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private
nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS
treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the
by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or
church, the gay bar, and on and on.109
Sotomayor noted that “[a]wareness that the Government may be
watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the
Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private
aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.”110 Sotomayor made clear that
citizens may not reasonably expect their movements to be recorded and
aggregated such that details of their associations and identity would be
revealed.111 More specifically, she indicated that it might be time to
reconsider the notion that an individual has no reasonable expectation of

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Hofhenke, supra note 39, at 8–9.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009).
Jones, 123 S. Ct. at 955 (citing Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199).
Id. at 956.
Id.
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privacy in information that is voluntarily disclosed to a third party. 112 In
the digital age, possession of a cell phone often means that the details of
every movement are disclosed to a third party.113 It might be time,
Sotomayor says, to stop treating “secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”114
Sotomayor’s view fits nicely under the Wittgensteinian approach.
Citizens’ lives are lived in public spaces within a publicly observable
community. Citizens, however, mindfully expose certain moments of their
lives to the public, and certain aspects of their lives to certain persons
based upon a chosen relationship with them. Nonetheless, citizens act with
the certainty that their patterns of behavior are, in fact, private—not
dissected or assessed by the government. Indeed, that certainty is
presupposed in their unreflective action, which exhibits a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
Of interest is that in another Jones concurring opinion, Justice Alito
indicated that the level of crime might determine the reasonableness of
advanced technology monitoring.115 Alito claimed that the placement of
the GPS on the defendant’s car did not itself constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment.116 Alito argued that the Court ought not to have
focused on “technical trespass” and instead should have used a Katz
expectation of privacy test, even though “judges are apt to confuse their
own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable
person to which the Katz test looks.”117 Alito also indicated that what
society expects to be reasonable may shift as technology advances118:
“[u]nder this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our
society has recognized as reasonable.”119 Longer-term GPS monitoring,
however, in investigations of most offenses—presumably, lesser
offenses—impinges upon expectations of privacy.120
Justice Alito’s allusion that the type of crime being investigated might
impact the reasonableness of privacy expectations is alarming. As one
legal scholar noted, “Justice Alito’s ‘level of crime’ argument is offputting mainly because this is not how the Fourth Amendment normally
operates; individuals either have a reasonable expectation of privacy,
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 957.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 962 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 960.
Id. at 964.
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based on the circumstances, or they do not.”121 This Article concurs:
persons have actional certainty of privacy regardless of the criminal harm
they may cause. In sum, Justice Alito’s claim would not fit well under the
Wittgensteinian approach because persons have an expectation of privacy
that is borne out in their unreflective actions. “Reasonableness” here is
neither variable, nor is it provisionally fixed based upon assessments such
as severity of crime. Reasonableness is located in what Wittgenstein calls
the bedrock, and it is reflected in the certainty of non-propositional, nonratiocinated actions.122
B. The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment
Justice Sotomayor invoked what is called the “mosaic theory”123 in her
Jones concurrence, and this theory is also reflected in Chief Justice
Roberts’s analysis in Riley v. California.124 Under the mosaic theory of the
Fourth Amendment, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence of
steps rather than as individual steps.125 This theory may serve to explain
the reasonableness of expectations of privacy with regard to continuous
monitoring and the aggregation of data relating to an individual’s life, as
drones are designed to do. “Drone surveillance that tracks an individual’s
movements for hours, days, or weeks may qualify as an unreasonable
search absent a warrant. . . . The biggest challenge with the mosaic theory
is its lack of clarity as to what the threshold amount of surveillance is
before the Fourth Amendment kicks in.”126 In Jones, both concurrences
agreed that 28 days was too long, but declined to set out a specific timeline
or cut-off point.127
The mosaic approach recognizes the actional certainty with which
citizens live their lives. This approach rejects applying the plain-view

121. Hofhenke, supra note 39, at 17.
122. ON CERTAINTY, supra note 55, § 217.
123. The “mosaic theory” label was first used by legal scholar Orin Kerr in a blog
post. See Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth Amendment,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-ccircuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-afourth-amendment-search/ [https://perma.cc/JZ62-J9C7].
124. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). In Riley, the Court ruled that law enforcement
generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone
seized from an individual who has been arrested. See id. at 2485.
125. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012).
126. Hofhenke, supra note 39, at 18.
127. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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doctrine, which might be reasonably applied when a police officer sees
clear, decisive steps taken toward commission of a criminal offense—
actions that would ground probable cause—but that should not be used to
justify long-term surveillance without a warrant. The mosaic approach
may be used to support the conclusion that law enforcement must use a
warrant every time they deploy a drone. Under the assumption that drone
surveillance by law enforcement violates a citizen’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, probable cause should have to be demonstrated in
every case in which a drone was used.128
Legal scholar Orin Kerr, however, has argued that courts abandoning
a sequential approach to the Fourth Amendment in favor of a mosaic
approach is a mistake.129 Before recent cases that seem to apply the mosaic
theory, courts looked at sequences of snapshots of governmental action
and assessed it in isolation.130 Because the mosaic theory rejects the
“building block of the sequential approach,” Kerr argued, the theory would
be difficult to administer.131 Kerr worried about what specific standard
would be developed by the courts under a mosaic analysis; how law
enforcement conduct would be grouped into a cohesive whole; and how
courts would determine if a mosaic search was reasonable.132
Kerr claims three different approaches to determining society’s
reasonable expectation of privacy have emerged from the mosaic cases.133
Justice Alito’s standard focused on societal expectations about law
enforcement practices.134 Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, argued
that a search occurs when the government can learn details about a
person’s personal life “at will.”135 Justice Ginsberg focused on whether the
government learned more than a stranger could have observed.136 Justice
Sotomayor’s argument goes further than Kerr’s interpretation, however.
In People v. Weaver, Justice Sotomayor indicated that a society’s
reasonable expectation of privacy—even under the most charitable
interpretations of “reasonable”—has been violated given the wealth of
information that can be extracted from a GPS device.137 This Article
128. See Hofhenke, supra note 39 (concluding that use of drone surveillance
ought to always require a warrant).
129. Kerr, supra note 125, at 344.
130. Id. at 315.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 329.
133. Id. at 330.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 331.
137. 909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009).
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proposes that the Court continue to use the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard in cases in which the mosaic theory is applied; the
standard would simply be applied to continuous monitoring instead of
specific instances of monitoring.
Kerr worried which sort of government action would constitute a
search under the mosaic theory.138 Designation of law enforcement action
as a search based upon physical trespass is certainly easier. The Court
already indicated its willingness, however, to turn away from trespassbased searches when necessary and focus on reasonable expectations of
privacy in Katz.139 The Katz test should be used in cases involving drone
surveillance by law enforcement. Given the current state of technology
and law enforcement practices, the question is whether citizens would
reasonably expect to be subject to continuous surveillance of their
movements, when this surveillance is evaluated by computer software
looking for patterns of behavior that might indicate criminal activity. The
expectation should not depend simply on what individual behaviors a
person attempted to keep private, as Sotomayor suggested, but also on
whether citizens reasonably expect their patterns of behavior, possibly
even discerned by a computer program, to be private.
Assessing society’s reasonable expectation of privacy might best be
accomplished when observed within a point of contrast between that
which persons knowingly expose to the public—to which they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy—and the non-ratiocinated, actional
certainty that persons have that they are living their lives in private—out
of sight from government eyes.140 Citizens know that while their particular
public movements are observable and in “plain view,” they nonetheless
act with the unreflective certainty that the government is not compiling
and assessing these particular movements to observe certain “patterns of
behavior.”141 A compilation of these snapshots reveals a large and detailed

138. Kerr, supra note 125, at 332.
139. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
140. See discussion supra Part III.
141. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“The net result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at a
relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any
person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may
‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society.’ I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account
when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in
the sum of one’s public movements. I would ask whether people reasonably
expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
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part of citizens’ lives: their characters, identities, and affiliations. Through
their unreflective actions, citizens clearly exhibit a reasonable expectation
that these aspects of their lives will remain private.
Finally, Kerr worried about how long and how in-depth surveillance
must be to constitute a search.142 These factors, however, must be
determined by the courts as cases arise. Of the nine Supreme Court
Justices, five indicated in Jones that 28 days of GPS surveillance, even in
absence of a physical trespass, constituted a search.143 This holding alone,
however, might be insufficient to indicate to law enforcement that they
cannot deploy drones for continuous monitoring of patterns of behavior.
If law enforcement is interested primarily in a specific citizen’s patterns
of behavior, they ought to have probable cause already to perform drone
surveillance on that citizen.
CONCLUSION
Even what a person exposes to the public may warrant an expectation
of privacy, especially when taken as a collective whole. This expectation
is demonstrated in the certainty of his unreflective actions.144 That is to
say, it is reasonable to assume that people have an expectation of privacy
with regard to the details of their lives and identities because this
expectation is borne out in their unreflective actions. “Reasonableness” is
located in what Wittgenstein calls the “bedrock,” and it is one among many
of society’s core, unreflective convictions that contribute to society’s
epistemic foundation.145 Seeing this principle in action is not difficult.
Assume that because of government surveillance, anything that could be
deduced from public actions, including life plans, goals, and other details,
were not private. Consider what effect this lack of privacy would have on
citizens’ actions—especially those who felt their preferences or identities
were not the preferences and identities favored by the government, or
those who were worried the government might be biased against them in
the future. If citizens no longer had an expectation of privacy, they may
not perform their daily actions in the same way they would perform them
had they possessed this expectation. They act with the unreflective
certainty that they are living their lives in private. Such an expectation is
reasonable and, by virtue of our unreflective actions, necessary.
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”).
142. Kerr, supra note 125, at 333.
143. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
144. Supra Part III.
145. See PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 68, § 217.
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Although the use of drones will undoubtedly provide law enforcement
agencies with a new means of gathering intelligence, these unmanned
aircrafts bring with them a host of legal and epistemic challenges. The
principal issue turns on what reasonably constitutes a search. Because
drones can remain airborne for extended periods, drone surveillance by
law enforcement would violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. In
Katz, the Supreme Court held that what a person “seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”146 Citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to information that could be deduced from long-term surveillance
of citizen actions. Therefore, a warrant should be required in every case in
which law enforcement uses a drone for surveillance of citizen actions.

146. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

